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p-DOMINANCE  AND  BELIEF POTENTIAL 
BY STEPHEN MORRIS,  RAFAEL  ROB,  AND HYUN  SONG  SHIN1 
This  paper  elucidates  the  logic  behind  recent  papers  which  show  that  a  unique 
equilibrium is selected  in the presence of higher order uncertainty, i.e., when players lack 
common knowledge. We introduce two new concepts: belief potential of the information 
system  and  p-dominance  of  Nash-equilibria  of  the  game,  and  show  that  a Nash-equi- 
librium is uniquely selected  whenever its p-dominance  is below the belief potential. This 
criterion applies to many-action games, not merely 2 x 2 games. It also applies to games 
without  dominant  strategies,  where  the  set  of  equilibria  is  shown  to  be  smaller  and 
simpler than might be initially conjectured. Finally, the new concepts help understand the 
circumstances  under  which  the  set  of  equilibria varies  with  the  amount  of  common 
knowledge among players. 
KEYWORDS:  Common knowledge,  higher-order uncertainty, infection  argument, equi- 
librium selection,  risk-dominance, stochastic potential. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
WHEN PAYOFFS  IN A GAME are not common knowledge,  the outcome depends 
not only on players'  beliefs about  payoffs,  but also on their beliefs about  others' 
beliefs about payoffs, on their beliefs about others' beliefs about their own 
beliefs, and so on  ad infinitum.  Initially, it might be  expected that such a 
hierarchy  of beliefs would, if anything,  enlarge  the set of equilibrium  outcomes. 
This paper argues,  however,  that in certain  games  it reduces  the set of equilibria 
to a unique outcome. The logic behind this is as follows. Suppose that one 
player is known to take a certain action at some information  set (which may 
itself have a very small probability).  Then this knowledge  might  imply  a unique 
best response  by some other player  at information  sets where the first  informa- 
tion set  is thought possible. This, in turn, implies how the original player 
responds  to that knowledge,  at a yet larger  information  set, and so on. If this 
chain of reasoning  results in a unique action profile, then we have elicited a 
unique equilibrium. 
Infection  arguments  of this kind  have  been used in a number  of recent  papers. 
Rubinstein's  (1989) electronic mail game example showed how outcomes of a 
game with common  knowledge  of payoffs  may be very different  from outcomes 
of the game with a "small"  departure  from common  knowledge.  Carlsson  and 
van Damme (1993)  showed  how a natural  representation  of "global  uncertainty" 
implies that the risk-dominant  action is always  played in any particular  realiza- 
tion of payoffs  in a two-person,  two-action  game. Shin and Williamson  (1992) 
showed that in a class of coordination  games with incomplete  information,  the 
1 We  thank  seminar  participants  at  CORE,  SITE,  Churchill  College  (Cambridge),  Nuffield 
College (Oxford), Warwick University, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Universidad Carlos III 
de  Madrid,  the  1993  summer workshop  at  Gerzensee,  Switzerland  and  the  GREQE  Marseille 
Conference  on  "Epistemic  Logic  and  the  Theory  of  Games."  Special  thanks are due  to  Dieter 
Balkenborg, Chris Harris, Atsushi  Kajii, George  Mailath, Meg Meyer, Dov  Samet,  and Fernando 
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only  pure-strategy  equilibria  involve  each player  choosing  a "simple"  strategy-a 
strategy  which is constant  across states-even  when state-contingent  strategies 
are Pareto-improving.  Each of  these papers uses a version of the infection 
argument. 
Our primary  purpose here is to delineate, for two-person  finite games of 
incomplete  information,  exactly  which  properties  of payoffs  and the information 
structure  allow such an argument  to operate. When is it the case that some 
player  choosing  a certain  action  somewhere  on the state space implies  that each 
player  chooses the same action  everywhere  on the state space?  We give a global 
version  of the infection argument,  a version  which is independent  of where the 
infection  starts.  In Section  3, we introduce  the notion  of belief  potential,  which  is 
a property  of the information  system  and measures  the extent  to which  informa- 
tion sets overlap.  Roughly,  the belief potential  is the largest  probability  p such 
that, for any information  set of either player, some statement  of the form "1 
believes with probability  at least p  that 2 believes with probability  at least p 
that 1 believes  ... that the true state is in the original  information  set" is true at 
every state. In Section 4, we introduce  the notion of p-dominance  for a strict 
Nash equilibrium.  An action  pair is p-dominant  if each action  is a best response 
to any conjecture  placing at least probability  p on the other player  taking his 
action in the pair. Our results show that the relationship  between the belief 
potential  of the information  system  and the level of p-dominance  of Nash-equi- 
libria  of the game determine  whether  the infection argument  operates. 
These new concepts allow us to evaluate  and extend earlier  arguments  using 
the infection argument.  Carlsson  and van Damme (1993) showed  how a certain 
kind  of global  uncertainty  implies  that a risk-dominant  equilibrium  is selected in 
2 x 2  games. Interestingly,  this prediction coincides with other attempts.  to 
select  among strict Nash equilibria by other methods-i.e.,  the  axiomatic 
approach  of Harsanyi  and Selten (1988)  and the evolutive  approach  of Kandori, 
Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). Although these earlier attempts 
provide  clear answers  for 2 x 2 games,  the mode of their argument  is specific  to 
this class, with the consequence  that generalizations  to larger  classes of games 
are not obvious. However, by appeal to the notions of belief potential and 
p-dominance,  we are able to construct  an argument  for many-action  games. In 
particular,  we show that if some action pair is p-dominant  at every  state of the 
world, one of those actions is a dominant strategy  for some player at some 
information  set, and the belief potential exceeds p,  then that action pair is 
played everywhere.  Moreover, this result is based on  iterative deletion of 
dominated  strategies, and not on the more restrictive  equilibrium  reasoning. 
Conversely,  we show that for any p  greater than the belief potential, it is 
possible to construct  a game where some action pair is p-dominant  at every 
state of the world,  one of those actions  is a dominant  strategy  for some player  at 
some information set,  and yet  a  pure-strategy  Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
involves  other actions  being played somewhere  on the state space. 
Another application  of our concepts is to the continuity  of equilibria  with 
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possess. Rubinstein  (1989)  argued  that his example  shows  that a slight  departure 
from common  knowledge  (in the sense of a large but finite number  of levels of 
iterated knowledge) alters discontinuously  the  outcome(s) that would have 
occurred  under  common  knowledge.  An ensuing  paper  by Monderer  and Samet 
(1989) argues that the  discontinuity  is  an artifact of  the way that "almost 
common knowledge"  is defined, and that continuity can be  restored by an 
appropriate  definition  of "closeness"  on information  structures.2  In particular, 
an event is said to be common  p-belief if everyone  believes it with probability  at 
least p,  everyone believes with probability  p  that everyone believes it with 
probability  p,  and so on ad infinitum.  If payoffs are common p-belief, for p 
close to one, then equilibrium  outcomes are close to those under common 
knowledge.  We show  that the infection  argument  operates exactly  when there is 
no nontrivial  event which is common p-belief for p  close to one. But we also 
argue  that this situation  arises  naturally  in the finite (or even countably  infinite) 
state-space  case. Therefore,  in such cases there is no contradiction  between the 
Rubinstein and the Monderer-Samet  approaches,  although the issue acquires 
greater  interest in the infinite  state-space  case. 
Carlsson  and van Damme (1993) and our main result rely on the action of 
some player at some information  set starting  the infection argument.  But it is 
also possible to make a conditional  statement:  if a certain action is played in 
some Bayesian  Nash equilibrium,  then it is played everywhere  in that equilib- 
rium.  This means that, in a two-action  game, if a certain action is p-dominant 
everywhere,  then the only possible  pure-strategy  Bayesian  Nash equilibria  are to 
always  play the p-dominant  action pair, or to always  play the other action pair. 
In other words,  we rule out the possibility  of equilibria  where a player  chooses 
one action at a certain subset of states and then switches  to another action at 
other states. This result illustrates  that the infection argument  can reduce the 
set  of  equilibria even when  there  are  no  dominant strategies. Shin and 
Williamson's  (1992) more general argument  for such "simple"  strategies  uses 
similar  logic but relies on continuous  action spaces. 
The remainder  of the paper is organized  as follows. In the next section, we 
provide  a "leading  example"  which illustrates  some of the paper's  key ideas. In 
Section 3, we define the belief potential  of an information  system.  In Section 4, 
we characterize  the p-dominance  of strict Nash equilibria.  Section 5 connects 
these concepts and gives the main results. 
2.  LEADING  EXAMPLE 
Consider  the following  incomplete  information  game. There is a state space 
consisting  of 2N states, Q = {1,  2,... ,2N},  with each state equally  likely.  There 
are  two  players:  1  observes  information  partition,  Y1-  = ({1},  {2, 3},  ...  {2N - 
2, 2N -  1},  {2N}), while 2 observes  partition,  92  =  ({1, 2},  {3,  4},... {2N -  1,  2N}). 
2 Stinchcombe  (1989) introduced  a related notion of almost common  knowledge,  which is in 
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Information  systems with this structure  of overlapping  information  sets arise 
naturally in  many classes of  problems where there is  a  lack of  common 
knowledge.  Examples  include the coordinated  attack  problem  of the computer 
science literature (Halpern (1986)), the  electronic-mail  game of  Rubinstein 
(1989), and the hidden envelopes trading  problem  of Geanakoplos  (1992). 
Now suppose that at each information  set, each player has a choice of two 
actions, L or R; if the true state is cv,  then payoffs  are: 
Player  2 
L  R 
Player 1  L  2,2  0,0 
R  0,0  x1(co), x2(cv) 
where  xi: Q  (-oo,  2), and xi(Z)  is constant on player i's information set for 
i = 1,  2. Now suppose that in addition, xi(Z) < 0 for some i and cv.  For xi(w) 
positive, there are two strict Nash equilibria  of this 2 x 2 game. However,  for 
the incomplete-information  game as a whole, playing  "L" everywhere  is the only 
strategy  which survives  iterated deletion of dominated  strategies.  To see why, 
observe  that player i must play "L" at the information  set which  contains  the cv 
for which xi(Z) < 0. Suppose that i's information  at c  is {co,  cv  + 1} and that 
c + 1 < 2N (an analogous  argument  holds if i's information  at to is {w -  1, w}). 
But now, the other player,  j, has information  sets {cv  -  1, cv}  and {(o  + 1, cv  + 2} 
overlapping  that first information  set. At those information  sets, she assigns 
probability  at least 1/2  to player i choosing "L." But then, by the assumption 
that xj(w) < 2, for all c  E Q,  "L" must be the best response for player j on 
those information  sets. But now an inductive  argument  shows  this must be true 
for all states. Note that for this argument  it does not matter  at which o we have 
xi(Z) < 0, only that such an cv  exists. Hence, the infection argument  is global, 
not local. 
We can also see in this example  that an infection  argument  makes  interesting 
predictions  even when there does not exist a dominant  strategy.  Suppose now 
that xi(Z) > 0, for all  w E Q and i = 1,  2. Consider a pure-strategy  Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium  (BNE) where "L" is played  by some player  at some informa- 
tion set. By exactly the argument above, we see  that "L" must be played 
everywhere  in that equilibrium.  Thus,  there exist exactly  two pure-strategy  BNE: 
both always  play L and both always  play R. 
We want to explore  what makes this infection argument  operate in general. 
In this example,  two properties  were key. First, action L was always  the unique 
best response  for any  player  on any information  set where he assigned  probabil- 
ity 1/2  to the other player  choosing L. Second, if we fix any information  set E 
of any player,  some statement  of the form "1 believes with probability  1/2  that 
2 believes with probability  1/2  that 1 believes  ... that the true state is in E" is 
always  true. The crucial  fact is that the probability  in the second statement  is no P-DOMINANCE  149 
smaller  than the probability  in the first  (the fact that the probabilities  are both 
1/2 is immaterial-any probabilities  in (0, 1) will do). The next sections  general- 
ize this idea by introducing  properties  of the information  system  and properties 
of the payoffs,  and showing  that the relationship  between them gives a sufficient 
condition  for the infection argument  to operate. 
3.  THE  INFORMATION  SYSTEM  AND  THE  BELIEF  POTENTIAL 
In this section, we show how a single number, the belief  potential, can be 
thought  of as measuring  the susceptibility  of the information  system  to infection. 
First,  we  introduce  notation.  An  information system  is  the  structure 
[fl,{1,2},{99}i=1 2,1T],  where [2 is a finite set of states of the world;  {1,2} is the 
set of  players; 9ti  is the partition of  states of  the world representing  the 
information  of player i; and rr  is a strictly  positive  prior  probability  distribution 
on [.  Each player  is assumed  to share the same prior rr on  2. We will write cv 
for a typical element of  [2.  Then  IT(w)  is the probability of state cv.  We will also 
write Pi(w) for the element of i's partition,  i,  containing  state cv.  Thus if the 
true state is cv,  Pi(Z) is the set of states  which  player  i thinks  possible.  We write 
Y[  for the field generated  by i's partition,  i.e., the set of unions and intersec- 
tions of events in  9j. We assume that there is some nontrivial  information  so 
that for some i,  =  A {f2}. 
The belief potential is defined using the idea of belief  operators  on the state 
space. Such belief operators  were introduced  in a related context  by Monderer 
and Samet (1989).  Write the conditional  probability  of event E, given event F, 
as  IT[EIF] =  Y2  ErEr(FIT(C)/YW  FIT(Wu). Now define player l's  p-belief  opera- 
tor, BP:  2  "-*  2Q, by 
(3.1)  BPE = [{t  E  QH(EIP1(cv))  >p} . 
Thus BP'E is the set of states where player  1 attaches  probability  at least p to 
the event E. With BP defined analogously,  BPBPE  is the set of states where 2 
believes with probability  p that 1 believes with probability  p that event E will 
occur. We will be interested in the set of states where either this is the case, 
or E  is true. Thus define the operator HP(-) as HPE  BfPBPE  U E.  Notice 
that, for any given  prior 7r, there exists an E > 0 such that, for all p <  ,  BP'E  = 
{w E QIP1(iv)  n E X  0}.  Therefore,  if there is no nontrivial  common  knowledge 
and p  is sufficiently  small, HP is a strictly increasing  function on nontrivial 
events in 91i i.e., E' DE  HP'(E') D HP'(E) (c  means "weak  inclusion").  Thus 
progressive  application  of HP will eventually  cover the whole state space. We 
will be interested  in the largest p for which this is true. 
DEFINITION:  The belief  potential, ul(E),  of an event E is the largest number p 
such that, for some  k >  1, [HP ]kE  = Q2. 
To see that every event has a well defined belief potential, notice first that 
p > q implies BPE cBqE: If an event is believed  with probability  at least p, it is 150  S.  MORRIS,  R.  ROB,  AND  H.  S.  SHIN 
believed with probability  at least q, if p  is strictly greater than q. Now, by 
induction,  we know that p > q implies that [H  ]kE c [Hql]kE. But since belief 
operators are defined in terms of a weak inequality, to  E BiqE for all q <p 
implies cv  E B/PE. So there exists a largest  p such that the above  property  holds. 
It would be possible to derive results using this local (i.e., event-specific) 
notion of belief potential.  But our main result,  like the example  in the previous 
section, does not depend on a particular  event starting  the infection argument. 
The belief potential of the information  system is the largest p  such that the 
infection argument  works  for every  nontrivial  event measurable  with respect to 
some individual's  partition. 
DEFINITION:  The belief potential, a,  of an information system is the minimum 
belief potential  of any nonempty  measurable  event in the system: 
(3.2)  or  min  oi(E). 
iE{1,2),EE  Y[\0 
It is useful to illustrate this notion by means of an example. Consider  the 
following  information  system: 
Q2=  {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}, 
41  = ({1,2,3},{4,5,6},  {7,8,9}), 
42=  ({1,4,7},{2,5,  8}, {3,6,9}), 
r 
21 ' 7 ' 7 ' 7 '21 ' 7'  7'  7'  21 
Consider  event  E =  {1,2,3}.  If  p > 3/7;  then  BPE =  0.  Thus  the  belief 
potential of  E  can be  no  more than 3/7.  Suppose 1/7  <p <3/7.  Then 
BPE = {2, 3,5,6,8,  9} and  BPBPE = Q.  Thus  ul(E)  = 3/7.  By the  symmetry of 
the example, the belief potential of every other information  set is also 3/7; 
larger events measurable on  some individual's  partition have higher belief 
potential, and so the (global)  belief potential  of this information  system  is 3/7. 
As we will see in Section 5, the notion of belief potential  is precisely  what is 
needed in characterizing  those situations in which the "infection argument" 
operates.3  It can also be shown that the belief potential is the mirror  image of 
the notion of common  belief, as defined by Monderer  and Samet (1989). The 
following lemma is  important in  developing our arguments,  and has some 
independent  interest.  All proofs for this section are presented  in the Appendix. 
LEMMA  3.1:  Suppose or is the belief potential of the information system. Then, 
the following three statements are equivalent: 
(i)  p > cr. 
(ii) There is an  event E  such  that BJPE  cE  for  all j  and B/PE  e  {0,  Q} for 
some i. 
(iii)  There is an event Ei E  Fj  \{0,  Q} such that, for j #  i,  B/PBJPE c Ei. 
3Sorin  (1993) introduces a related measure of the global impact of an event on  an information 
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Monderer  and Samet (1989, p. 177) show that the notion of common  belief 
can be given a "fixed  point"  characterization  in terms  of "p-evident"  events.  An 
event E  is said to be p-evident if  E c BjPE  for all j.  Event A  is common 
p-belief  at  cv if  and only if  there exists a  p-evident event  E  such that 
w EFE  cBBjPA,  for all j. Our claim  that the belief potential  is the mirror  image  of 
common  belief is embodied  in the following  result.4 
THEOREM  3.1:  Suppose a  is the belief  potential of the information system. Then 
<  1 - p  if and only if there is a p-evident event E for  which BPE e  {0, Q} for 
some i. 
Thus, for a  given belief potential, we  can guarantee the  existence of  a 
(1 -  o)-evident event which is believed somewhere, but not everywhere,  by 
some individual.  Conversely,  if we find a nontrivial  p-evident event with the 
largest  possible p, then a = 1 - p. Anticipating  our main result concerning  the 
infection argument  in Section 5, we can say that Theorem 3.1 provides  a link 
between common  beliefs and the infection argument. 
It is a consequence  of Theorem  3.1 that the belief potential  of an information 
system is zero if and only if there exist nontrivial  subsets of the state space 
which are 1-evident,  which in this context implies they are common  knowledge 
whenever they are true. This shows when the  lower bound of  the  belief 
potential is attained.  We can also provide  an upper  bound. 
THEOREM  3.2:  The belief potential  of  any information system is less than or 
equal to 1/2. 
Theorem  3.2 is tight in the sense that 1/2  is not only an upper  bound on the 
belief potential,  but is also attained  for some information  systems.  The informa- 
tion system  in the example  of Section 2 has a belief potential  of 1/2. 
4.  p-DOMINANCE 
Having set out the key property  of the information  system,  we now turn to 
payoffs.  An incomplete-information  game consists  of G = [I, {AJ}i=1,2,  9i1i=1,2] 
where I is an information  system  as described  in the previous  section;  Ai is the 
finite set of actions  available  to player i; and gi: A x Q --* R is player i's payoff 
function, where  A =A1  xA2.  Assume  players know their own payoff function, 
i.e.,  gi(a; w) is measurable with respect to  Ri. 
Thus, in each state cv,  there is a one-shot (complete-information)  game,  with 
payoff function gi(ai, aj; to). A pure strategy  for player i  in the incomplete- 
information  game  is  a  function  si:  f  ---Ai,  measurable  with  respect  to  his 
partition.  Write Si for the set of such pure strategies.  Now a pure-strategy  pair 
4A  related treatment can be found in Monderer and Samet (1990, p. 15-16)  although they don't 
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(Sl,  S2)  is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the incomplete-information  game if, 
for i /j  and all ti E Si, 
E  rr(w)gi[si(w),sj(w);  to] >  E  rr(w)gi[ti(w),sj(w);  to]. 
For a pair of actions  (a1,  a2) to infect the state space, we require  the notion 
that a. is a best response for player i to aj, just as long as player i assigns  at 
least probability  p  to j  choosing action aj (regardless  of what probability  he 
assigns  to other possible actions). 
DEFINITION:  Action pair (a1,  a2)  is p-dominant  in the state cv game if, for 
every  probability  distribution  A on Ai such that A(a1) > p and all bi eiA, 
F,  A(bj)gi(ai, bj;  (o) >  E:  A(bj)gi(bi, bj; 1) 
bjeAj  bjeAj 
If (a1,  a2) is p-dominant,  ai is the unique  best response  for player  i as long as 
he believes that the other player  will play a1 with probability  at least p. This 
definition  is equivalent  to requiring  (a1,  a2) to be p-dominant  in every  two-by-two 
game generated  by restricting  the multi-action  game to action  sets B1 = {a1,  b1}, 
B2 -{a2,  b21 for some b1 eA1, b2 eA2.  Notice that if (a1,  a2) is p-dominant  for 
some p, then (a1,  a2) is q-dominant  for any p < q < 1. 
The notion of p-dominance  unifies  a number  of standard  concepts:  (a1,  a2) is 
a strict Nash equilibrium  if (a1,  a2) is 1-dominant,  and actions a1 and a2 are 
dominant actions if  (a1,  a2)  is  0-dominant.  Also  notice that the  notion of 
p-dominance  introduced  here generalizes  Harsanyi  and Selten's  (1988)  notion  of 
risk  dominance.  To see why,  observe  that action  pair (a1,  a2) is 1/2-dominant  in 
the state cv complete-information  game if, for i #j  and for all b1 e Al  and 
b2 EA2, 
gi(aj,  aj; co) +  1gi(ai,  bj; co) >  gi(bi, aj; co) +  (  bj; cv). 
This exactly  coincides  with Harsanyi  and Selten's risk-dominance  in symmet- 
ric two-action  games. For many-action  symmetric  games, the notion of  1/2- 
dominance  is more stringent  than risk  dominance,  however,  as it makes  compar- 
isons between the candidate  action pair and all other actions,  not just between 
Nash equilibrium  action pairs. 
An example  will illustrate  the character  of p-dominance  and the relation  to 
risk-dominance.  Consider  the following  symmetric  game. 
Player  2 
L  C  R 
T  7,7  0,0  0,0 
Player  1  M  0,0  2,2  7,0 
D  0,0  0,7  8,8 P-DOMINANCE  153 
This game has three strict Nash equilibria:  (T, L), (M, C), and (D, R). Risk 
dominance in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) involves pairwise comparisons  of 
these strict  Nash equilibria:  (T, L) risk  dominates  (M, C), (M, C) risk  dominates 
(D, R), and (D, R) risk dominates  (T, L). Thus, the relationship  may  very well 
be cyclical.  The notion of p-dominance  we introduced  is global, in the sense 
that each strict Nash equilibrium  action pair is being compared  with all other 
actions. In our terminology,  (T, L) is p-dominant  for every p  strictly  greater 
than 8/15;  (D, C)  is  p-dominant for  any p  greater than 7/9;  (D, R)  is 
p-dominant  for any p  greater  than 2/3.  So, for any 8/15  <p  <  2/3,  (T, L) is 
the  unique  p-dominant action pair. Therefore, a  suitable choice of  p  can 
eliminate the cycle, and pick a unique p-dominant action pair; but in this 
example a p  greater than 1/2  is required.  More generally,  Lemma  4.1 below 
shows  the following:  if there is more than one p-dominant  action  pair, then p is 
more than 1/2; and, generically  for games  with pure-strategy  equilibria,  there is 
some  p for which there is a unique  action pair which is p-dominant.  The proof 
to this lemma is in the Appendix. 
LEMMA  4.1: (i)  If p <  1/2,  there is at most one p-dominant action pair. 
(ii)  Generically in payoffs,  every game  has  either only  strictly mixed Nash 
equilibria or exactly one p-dominant Nash  equilibrium action pair  (a,,  a2),.  for 
some p. 
The main result of the next section is applicable  only if there exists an action 
pair which  is p-dominant  for some p less than or equal to 1/2  (since the belief 
potential is no larger  than 1/2,  as Theorem  3.2 shows).  Lemma  4.1 shows that 
there is at most one such action  pair.  But how likely  is it that there exists  such a 
pair? Note first that for generic symmetric  2 by 2 games with pure equilibria, 
there is always  a risk-dominant,  and thus a 1/2-dominant equilibrium.  But for 
many-action  games there need not exist 1/2-dominant equilibria,  as the exam- 
ple above shows. On the other hand, an earlier  version of our paper (Morris, 
Rob, and Shin (1993)) shows that 1/2-dominant equilibria  can occur in some 
contexts,  including  a partnership  game with many  actions. 
5.  BELIEF  POTENTIAL,  p-DOMINANCE,  AND  RISK  DOMINANCE 
We are now in a position to state the main theorem  of the paper. 
THEOREM  5.1:  Suppose that (1) the information system has belief potential of 
o-, (2) (a1, a2)  is o-dominant at every state; and (3) some player i at some state W* 
knows  the  event  "ai  is  a  strongly dominant  action."  Then playing  (a1, a2) 
everywhere  is the unique rationalizable strategy profile of the incomplete-informa- 
tion game. 
PROOF:  Let  Ri  be  the  set  of  rationalizable strategies of  i.  Let  U1= 
(co e  2 si(s)  =  ai, for all si e R}.  Thus f2i is the set of states where i  plays 154  s.  MORRIS,  R.  ROB,  AND  H.  S.  SHIN 
action ai in every rationalizable  strategy.  Let E = Pi(w*), i.e., the event where 
ai is strictly  dominant  for player i; clearly  E c ni.  Now by (2), B7QI c Qn and 
Bi'Qj  c12j. Thus Hi  =E  Bi?Bj?EUEc  Qi and by induction  [HiIkE cf2i  for all 
k. But by (1) [Hi']kE  = Q, so Qf=  =  =  Q.  Q.E.D. 
This result  should  be viewed in the light of Lemma  4.1, namely  that there can 
be at most one p-dominant  action pair if p < 1/2.  Since the belief potential 
cannot exceed 1/2,  Theorem 5.1 has an impact when some action pair is 
p-dominant  for a small p. The smaller  p  is, the greater  will be the impact of 
Theorem  5.1. 
Theorem 5.1 is also tight in the following sense. Suppose an information 
system has belief potential o-. Then for any p > o-, it is possible to specify 
payoffs  such that some action pair (a1,  a2) is p-dominant  at every state, some 
player i at some state w* knows the event "ai is a strongly  dominant  action," 
but there is a pure-strategy  Bayesian  Nash equilibrium  where ai is not played 
everywhere.  Let us give the construction,  since it helps illustrate  the significance 
of the belief potential. Choose a  such that p > a > o-; then (by clause (iii) of 
Lemma  3.1), there exists for some player  (say, 1), an event E1 E S1, E  0 0  or 
Q, such that BjaBaEl  cEl.  Now suppose that at states in E1, payoffs  are 
Player  2 
L  R 
Player 1  L  1-a,  1-a  1 -a,O 
R  0,  O,  0a 
while at states in  E1, payoffs  are 
Player  2 
L  R 
Player  1  L  |  1-a,l-a  0  ,0 
R  0  ,0  a, a 
Note that (L, L) is p-dominant  at every  state and L is a dominant  action for 1 
on event E1. This game has a pure strategy  Bayesian  Nash equilibrium  where 
s1(o) = L if t  cE1,  s1(w) = R if t  c  E1; S2(6U)=L  if wE=  B2PE1  and S2('W)=R 
if w E  B2PE1.  Player  2's strategy  is optimal,  since he will play L exactly  when 
he assigns probability  greater than a  to player 1 choosing L, i.e., on event 
B2aE1.  At all states in  E1, 1 assigns  probability  strictly  less than a to 2 playing 
L (since BaB aEl c El), and so plays R. 
Theorem 5.1 used the infection argument  and the existence of a strongly 
dominant  action to give a precise prediction  of play in a game of incomplete P-DOMINANCE  155 
information.  The corollary  which  follows makes  no assumption  about a strongly 
dominant  action somewhere  on the state space. Therefore,  we are not able to 
predict  uniquely  the outcome. Still, we can use the infection  argument  to make 
a conditional claim. 
COROLLARY:  Suppose that (1) the information system has belief potential of  oC; 
(2) (a,, a )  is o-dominant  at every  state. Suppose  that (S1(),  s2(0))  is a pure- 
strategy Bayesian  Nash  equilibrium of  the  incomplete-information game,  with 
sj(w) = ai for some i and some w. Then sj(w) = aj, for both i and all W. 
In the game described in the Corollary  (unlike in Theorem 5.1), iterated 
deletion of dominated  strategies  will typically  have no bite. Thus it could be that 
there are two action  pairs  which  are strict  pure-strategy  Nash equilibria  at every 
state, in which  case we know  that there are two simple  Bayesian  Nash equilibria 
where each of these action pairs is played everywhere.  Nonetheless, if one of 
these action pairs is o-dominant  (where o- is the belief potential), the condi- 
tional statement of the Corollary  can be made in reference to it, but not in 
reference to  the  other equilibrium.  However, if  each player has only two 
possible actions, the corollary  implies that in  any pure strategy BNE, only 
"simple"  strategies  are played.  That is, there may  be a pure strategy  BNE where 
each player  takes the action  which  is not in the o-dominant  action  profile.  But if 
one of the o-dominant  actions is ever taken, each player  takes the o-dominant 
action everywhere.  Put differently,  there are no  equilibria where a  player 
"alternates"  between actions.  This result need not apply,  however,  when there 
are more than two actions. 
Dept. of Economics, University  of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, U.S.A., 
Dept. of Economics, University  of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, U.S.A., 
and 
University  College, University  of Oxford, Oxford OX14BH, U.K 
Manuscript  received May, 1993;  final revision received  August, 1994. 
APPENDIX 
In the proofs, we appeal to the following properties of belief operators, which are stated without 
proof: 
(0)  E cF  implies BPE c BPF. 
(1)  If p > q, then BPE c B9E. 
(2) If  C) CB  E for all q < p,  then w c  BPE. 
(3)  If Ec E:,  then BP[EuF]=EUBPF. 
(4)  For a given information system and any p >  0, there exists q >  1 -  p such that B  E c E  E 
cBP  E. 
(5)  If q > 1-p,  then E cBPE  =*B  E c  -E. 
(6)  If  there are  two  individuals and  j = {11} for  some  i,  then  there exists an  event E  with 
EcB05  E, for all j,  and B?.5E e  {0, 12} for some i. 156  S.  MORRIS,  R.  ROB,  AND  H.  S.  SHIN 
PROOF  OF  LEMMA  3.1: [(iii) * (i)] Suppose  B PBjPEi cEi  for some j = i,  Ei E[  \{0, l2}. 
Then HiPEi  =  Ei for some i E {1,  2}, Ei E Y[\{0,  l2} 
H  [H/']kEi  =E  2  for all k>  1, for some iE  {1,2}, Eie  Y[\{0,d2} 
=lio(Ei) <p  for some i c  {1, 2},  Ei e  .e  \ {0,  l2} 
0* < p. 
[(i)  (iii)] Conversely,  suppose there does not exist Eic  = $\{0,  (2) such that BiPBjPEi  cEi, 
where j * i. Then HiP  is strictly  increasing  for all i, Ei E $t\{0,  l2} 
[Hp]kEi  = l2 for some k >  1, for all i, E, E  {0} 
=lio(Ei) >p  for all i, Ei E  [  \0 
ff>P. 
[(ii)  (iii)]  Suppose  BJPE  c E for all j and B/PE e  {0, Q2}  for some i. Let Ei = B/PE  e  {0, l2}; now 
for j * i (using  fact 0), BJPBJPEI  = B/BJPB'PE  c BJPB/PE  c B/PE  = El. 
[(iii)  (ii)] Suppose  B/PBJPE  c Ei  for some j #  i,  Ei e  f\  {0,  l2}. Now let E =  Ei u BJPEi.  Then 
(by fact 3 above)  BPE = Ei u B PB  PE=  Ei c  E;  BjPE= BjPEi  c E; and B PE = Ei e  {0, l2}. Thus  E 
satisfies  the property  of clause  (ii) of the Lemma. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1: Suppose  E cBfPE for all j and B/PE e {0,  l2} for some i. Then (1) (by 
fact 5) B9 c  -E  for all q > 1 - p,  for all j; (2) B9"  E  *  12,  for all q >  1 - p  (since q >  1 - p  and 
Bf9  E =  12  B PE = 0,  a contradiction);  (3) Bfl  9-E  # 0,  for all q E  (1 - p, q'),  for some q' > 1 - p 
(since  B 9  E = 0  for all q > 1 - p  BjPE = 12, a contradiction).  Now  by Lemma  3.1 we have q >  rf 
for all q E (1 - p, q'), i.e. of 6 1 -p. 
Suppose  p <  1 -  o-. Choose  some q > 1 -  p such  that fact 4 is satisfied.  Since  of < 1 -p  < q, there 
is (by Lemma  3.1) an event E with BjqE  c E for all i and B "E e {0,  (l2 for some i. Now (1) (by fact 
4)  -EcBjP-E,  for all j; (2) BP-E#0  (since  B  P  E=0  E=0=*E=(2=*B  9E=(2,  a 
contradiction);  (3) B/PE  * d2 (since  q>  1 -p  and BP  E =  d2  B 9E = 0,  a contradiction).  So 
there is a nontrivial  p-evident event whenever  p <  1 -  o.  By fact (2), there is also a nontrivial 
p-evident  event when p = 1 -  o. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2: By fact 6 above,  there exists a nontrivial  event which is 1/2-evident. 
Thus by Theorem 3.1, o-  6  1 -  1/2  = 1/2. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1: (i) Suppose p 6  1/2,  (a1,  a2) and (b1, b2) are p-dominant  and ai = bi. 
Then we have the contradictory  implications: 
gi(ai,  aj; w)  +  'gi(ai,  bj;  w)  >  'gi(bi,  aj;  w)  +  'gi(bi,  bj;), 
gi(bi,  aj; w)  +  2gi(bi,  bj; w)  >  'gi(ai,  aj; (w) +  'gi(ai,  bj; 0)). 
(ii) If there is a pure strategy  Nash equilibrium,  then generically  there is at least one strict  Nash 
equilibrium.  Generically,  every  strict  Nash equilibrium  will be p-dominant  for a different  set of p. 
For example,  if (a1,  a2) is a strict  Nash equilibrium,  adding  e to each player's  payoff  from action 
pair  (a1,  a2) will always  enlarge  the set of p for which  (a1,  a2) is p-dominant  and  weakly  reduce  the 
set of p for which  every  other strict  Nash equilibrium  pair  is p-dominant. 
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